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Abstract
Since 2007, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has debated the security 
implications of climate change on several occasions. This article addresses these 
debates by exploring two interrelated questions: What drives the continuous efforts 
to place climate change on the UNSC’s agenda and to what extent do the UNSC’s 
debates illustrate an ongoing process of climatization? To answer these, the article 
draws on the concept of climatization, which captures the process through which 
domains of international politics are framed through a climate lens and transformed 
as a result of this translation. It suggests that climate change has become a domi-
nant framing and an inescapable topic of international relations and that the UNSC 
debates follow a logic of expansion of climate politics by securing a steady climate 
agenda, attributing responsibility to the Council in the climate crisis, involving cli-
mate actors and advocating for climate-oriented policies to maintain international 
security.
Keywords Climate change · Climatization · International organizations · 
Securitization · Security Council · United Nations
Introduction: Debating Climate Threats at the UN Security Council
First, can climate security be achieved through the quick fix of securitization 
of climate change to address climate-related disasters? International peace and 
security considerations often trump other considerations. Defining a problem 
as a security challenge therefore often increases the attention and resources 
devoted to addressing it. Securitizing climate change may help to heighten 
public awareness, but securitization also has significant downsides. A secu-
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ritized approach risks pitting States into a competition, when cooperation is 
clearly the most productive avenue in tackling this threat. Thinking in security 
terms usually engenders overly militarized solutions to problems that inher-
ently require non-military responses to resolve them. In short, it brings the 
wrong actors to the table. As the saying goes, if all you have is a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail. (Excerpt from the Indian delegate’s intervention at 
the UNSC open debate held on 25 January 2019, UNSC S/PV.8451).
On 25 January 2019, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held its 4th 
official open debate on the security implications of climate change. Despite the 
growing engagement of some member states, the Council could not reach an agree-
ment on a presidential statement, let alone a resolution. Although an increasing 
number of states support the UNSC’s involvement in climate politics, it is still a 
very contentious issue as the quotation by the Indian delegate attests. Since the first 
debate in April 2007, the UNSC has discussed climate-related issues on multiple 
occasions: Five official open debates (17 April 2007; 20 July 2011; 11 July 2018; 25 
January 2019; and 24 July 2020) were supplemented by a series of informal meet-
ings (‘Arria-formula’ sessions) that directly or indirectly explored the contested links 
between climate change and international security.
In international relations, these meetings have been extensively studied. Among 
this work, two main trends emerge: one revisiting the institutional debate on the role 
and functions of the UNSC and a second one on the process of securitization of cli-
mate change. First, scholars have traced these different debates shedding light on the 
agenda setting process, the content of the discussions and the opposing arguments 
presented by member states (Conca et al. 2017; Cousins 2013; Elliott 2003; Penny 
2007; Scott and Ku 2018). They analyze how the Council integrates this emerging 
issue from an institutional perspective while questioning the potential role for the 
UNSC in the climate-security debate. Most of these studies consider why the UNSC 
should address climate change and how it could do it (Conca 2019; Conca et  al. 
2017; Elliott 2003; Scott and Ku 2018). They echo the monitoring and advocacy 
work conducted by different think tanks and policy-oriented research centers (Born 
2017) whose coordinated efforts have been highly publicized through the Planetary 
Security Initiative launched in 2015 by the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
They discuss the legitimacy of the UNSC in considering climate-related issues and 
its authority to act on such topics. They list a series of options for its action on cli-
mate change and question their feasibility. While generally advocating for a broader 
transformation of the UNSC, they often recognize that the current Council’s politics 
undermine the likelihood of the adoption by the UNSC of a strong framework on cli-
mate change (Conca 2019). A second trend in critical security studies has explored 
the case of the UNSC as an example of securitization of climate change (Andonova 
2010; Kurtz 2012; Maertens 2016; Methmann and Rothe 2013; Rothe 2016; Scott 
2012, 2008; Webersik 2012). Drawing on the work of the Copenhagen school on 
the discursive construction of security threats, these studies analyze the speech acts 
that intend to construct climate change as a security issue. The UNSC is both con-
sidered as a securitizing actor producing securitizing moves, especially through 
its 2011 presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011) and case-by-case 
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resolutions,1 and a securitization arena where member states and other speakers 
intend to proclaim climate threats. This work discusses the political implications of 
a security discourse applied to climate change and highlights the risk of militariza-
tion and depoliticization that could result from the UNSC’s engagement in climate 
politics (Ide 2020; Louis and Maertens 2021).
On the one hand, the first trend of research underlines the current challenges 
that the UNSC faces in addressing climate change. These studies show the political 
disagreements among its members who even struggle to have formal open debates 
as attested by the use of informal sessions. On the other hand, the work in critical 
security studies highlights the risks of tackling climate change as an isolated threat 
within the Council. Despite these conclusions and the repeated failures, there is still 
much interest in bringing climate change on the UNSC’s agenda.
This article proposes to discuss the persistence of such a political endeavor by 
drawing on recent work on the process of climatization (Aykut et al. 2017; Maertens 
and Baillat 2017; Oels 2013, 2012). Instead of looking at the process of securitiza-
tion of climate change, it considers the reversed process of climatization through 
which other domains of world politics are framed through a climate lens and trans-
formed as a result of such a translation. It therefore supplements both trends of 
research by exploring two interrelated questions: What drives the continuous efforts 
to place climate change on the UNSC’s agenda and to what extent do the UNSC’s 
debates illustrate an ongoing process of climatization? It suggests that climate 
change has become a dominant framing and an inescapable topic of international 
relations and that the debates conducted within the UNSC follow a logic of expan-
sion of climate politics. By looking at the UNSC’s case, it intends to give cues for a 
better understanding of the significant influence of climate change in world politics 
and global governance today.
Climate Threats: from Securitization to Climatization
Political discourse and academic work linking climate change to security have been 
studied by critical scholars, to understand the political motives of the actors drawing 
that connection. These scholars have identified two dominant narratives: (1) the role 
of climate change in causing conflicts and (2) the threat that climate change poses 
to various dimensions of human security (food, health, etc.) (Hardt 2017; Lucke 
et al. 2014; McDonald 2018, 2013; Oels 2012; Rothe 2016; Trombetta 2008). Most 
of this work relies on securitization theories to capture the way climate change has 
been discursively framed as a security threat. Developed by the Copenhagen School, 
the concept of securitization considers the social construction behind the notion 
of ‘security.’ For Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, ‘the exact definition and criteria of 
1 For instance, in the resolution 2349 adopted in March 2017 on the security situation in the Lake Chad 
Basin region, the Council ‘Recognises the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes 
among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertifica-
tion, land degradation, and food insecurity’ (S/RES/2349 (2017), §26).
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securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential 
threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (1998, p. 25). 
In other words the process would consist of political elite designating a threat to 
survival—through a speech act—and making it recognized as such. According to 
these authors, a successful securitization process would allow the issue to be treated 
with the urgent and exceptional measures that characterize the field of security. The 
Copenhagen School’s model, centered on a discursive analysis, has been widely 
criticized and expanded since its first formulation (Balzacq 2011; Collective 2006; 
McDonald 2008). Yet the securitization theories have inspired much work on the 
construction of the environment as a security issue and more recently on the case of 
climate change (Floyd 2010; Floyd and Matthew 2013; Lucke et al. 2014; McDon-
ald 2013; Methmann and Rothe 2013; Oels 2012; Rothe 2016; Trombetta 2011).
In parallel to the literature on the securitization of the environment in interna-
tional relations, the emergence of the concept of environmentalization in sociology 
can shed novel light on the relationship between environment and security. Like 
security matters, environmental issues can be socially constructed, through a process 
of ‘environmentalization.’ Acselrad (2010, p. 103) summarizes the work dedicated 
to this process in the following definition: ‘The term can be used to designate both 
the adoption of a generic environmental discourse by different social groups, as well 
as the concrete incorporation of environmental justifications to legitimate institu-
tional, political and scientific practices.’ The environmentalization of security can be 
approached as akin to Elbe’s (2010) formulations on the medicalization of security: 
He demonstrates how the connections between security and global health depend 
not only on the securitization of global health threats, but also on a process of medi-
calization of insecurity which impacts security practices. The environmentalization 
of security then aims to establish security activities as part of the environmental 
protection norms, policies and mandates (Maertens 2019). It also appears through 
practices and devices, shifted from the environmental sector to the security field.
Derived from the concept of environmentalization, climatization describes the 
process that defines a given issue as being part of the climate domain and relevant 
to climate policies. In the case of security, climatization is not a way that ‘new phe-
nomena are being constructed and exposed to the public sphere,’ but rather the way 
that ‘old phenomena are renamed’ (Acselrad 2010, p. 103) as pertaining to the cli-
mate field. Aykut et al (2017) study how the climate governance extends its sphere 
of influence by climatizing other domains of global politics. They rightly show that 
climatization highlights a powerful yet uneven process in which climate change 
increasingly becomes the dominant frame through which other issues and forms of 
global governance are mediated and hierarchized. It depends less on legal disposi-
tions in climate treaties or institutionalized linkages between international organiza-
tions. Instead it rests on the work of numerous actors which ‘translate’ issues and 
concerns using a climate lens. Work on environmentalization and climatization has 
been rather sparse in critical security studies, which has largely focused on the secu-
ritization of the environment and climate change. Without employing the concepts 
of climatization and environmentalization Trombetta (2008) approaches these ques-
tions by showing that the securitization of environmental issues leads to changes in 
terms of practices within the security field. Security actors integrate new logics of 
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action inspired from traditional environmental policies such as preventive actions 
and nonconfrontational responses. These conclusions echo Oels’s (2012, p. 197) 
definition of the climatization of security: “‘Climatization’ of the security field 
means that existing security practices are applied to the issue of climate change and 
that new practices from the field of climate policy are introduced into the security 
field.” Drawing on a Foucauldian approach and the Paris school’s perspective on 
(in)securitization and security professionals, she shows that ‘practices of disaster 
management are emerging in the defence sector while practices of adaptation are 
featured in migration and development policy’ (2012, p. 202). By identifying these 
emerging practices, she sheds light on the progressive climatization of the sectors 
of migration, development and defense while advocating for more research on the 
implications of the climatization of the security field.
Building on Oels’s work, Maertens and Baillat (2017) questioned the climatiza-
tion process through a detailed empirical case study. They looked at ‘how migra-
tion, security and conflict are framed as issues relevant to the climate convention’ 
during the climate summit COP21 held in Paris in December 2015 and concluded 
that ‘COP21 witnessed continued use of climatisation as a tool for alert, instrumen-
talised to shed light on climate change and sometimes also on issues completely 
unrelated to climate’ (2017, p. 130). This study captures different objectives behind 
the climatization of migration, security and conflict, stresses the uneven degrees of 
climatization between these issues and points to the resistance that limits climatiza-
tion. Yet it does not fully address the analytical implications of conceptualizing the 
relation between security and climate change as a process of climatization. Going 
further the present article unpacks the interrelated elements which compose the cli-
matization process.
The literature on the medicalization of security provides a strong basis to con-
ceptualize the various components of climatization processes. Drawing on differ-
ent disciplines and Foucault’s work, Elbe identifies three developments which sup-
port the medicalization of security: Insecurity is framed as a medical problem with 
a medical origin; medical professionals acquire a greater role in world politics; 
medical interventions are applied to secure populations (2010, pp. 22–29). Building 
on these conclusions, the present article approaches climatization as a definitional 
process which extends the realm of climate politics and identifies the different ele-
ments through which issues, actors and institutions are being climatized. Following 
an inductive and interpretative approach, I argue that the climatization of the UNSC 
consists of four interrelated developments: Climate change becomes an inescapa-
ble topic repeatedly put on the UNSC’s agenda; the UNSC is enjoined to assume a 
responsibility in the climate crisis; climate actors expand their roles in the Council; 
climate policies steer solutions to maintain international security. This demonstra-
tion expands Elbe’s initial framework in two ways. First, when applied to an actor 
like the UNSC instead of an issue, the framing process is twofold: The actor is pro-
gressively conceived as unavoidably concerned with climate change; and its role 
is becoming redefined in relation to its responsibility in the climate crisis. In other 
words, a climatized Council cannot escape climate change discussions. Secondly, 
while Elbe focuses on medical professionals, the case of climate change shows a 
growing role of not only climate professionals, including climate scientists, experts 
 L. Maertens 
and international organizations whose mandates address climate change, but also 
climate activists and climate change ‘victims.’ These elements are further explored 
in the following sections.
The multiple studies which have analyzed the content of the debates held within 
the UNSC on climate change highlight opposing arguments, agenda setting strate-
gies, alliances’ reconfigurations (especially since the North/South divide has been 
challenged by dissensions within both blocks) and member states’ evolving dis-
courses and positions over time (Born 2017; Scott and Ku 2018). Building on this 
work, this article revisits these debates (official and informal) in light of the concept 
of climatization. To do so, it relies on a qualitative content analysis of different pri-
mary sources: Official records of the five open debates held in the UNSC,2 UN press 
releases, on site3 and online information4 regarding informal discussions organized 
under the UNSC’s umbrella, complementary gray literature on the UNSC and think 
tanks’ advocacy and outreach communications on the UNSC’s engagement in cli-
mate politics. While the analysis covers all the debates, it does not intend to pre-
sent each discussion in detail or review every member states’ positions—this would 
repeat the detailed accounts available in the literature. Instead the article mentions 
selected abstracts representative of a specific discourse and presents illustrative 
examples of member states’ strategies that shed light on the process of climatization 
of the UNSC.
Drivers of climatization
Before delving into the four components of the climatization process, this section 
discusses the factors and contextual elements which drive the Council’s climatiza-
tion. Extensive work has explored which states are driving the introduction of cli-
mate change at the UNSC and why (Conca 2019; Conca et al. 2017; Dellmuth et al. 
2018; Scott and Ku 2018). Previous research on the securitization of climate change 
at the UNSC has also shown that the Council’s debates took place in a context of 
growing concerns over the magnitude of the climate crisis with securitizing moves 
aiming at sounding the alarm and advocating for stronger governmental commit-
ments. They also occurred when key security actors such as the US military showed 
increasing interest in the security implications of climate change. This section does 
not intend to reiterate these conclusions but rather pinpoints contextual elements 
which inform on the way the climatization process unfolds.
First, a key driver relates to the political gain expected from climatization. Schol-
ars, as India also pointed out, have shown that securitizing actors often expect to 
attract attention by designating climate threats while profiling themselves on this 
2 The article mainly focuses on the four first open debates.
3 I conducted a three-month participant observation within the UN Secretariat from October 2012 until 
February 2013. In that context, I attended the Arria-formula meeting dedicated to the security implica-
tions of climate change on 15 February 2013.
4 Some governmental position papers presented in the context of informal and non-recorded debates on 
climate change are available online on the official page dedicated to the permanent representations of 
member states to the UN or circulated to thinks tanks and medias for distribution and discussion.
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topic, especially for non-permanent members (Conca 2019; Maertens 2018;  Scott 
and Ku 2018). The climatization of the UNSC also follows political strategies to 
raise awareness, create political momentum, acquire resources and gain material 
and symbolic power thanks to a specific expertise or a critical exposure to climate 
risks. The election of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as the smallest state (about 
110′000 inhabitants) to secure a seat at the UNSC (starting from January 2020) can 
be interpreted as an example of the capital acquired by the climatization process. 
The permanent mission of the Caribbean multi-island nation defines its ‘unique 
opinions on the issue of climate change’ as the reason why it was elected5: In this 
case the political gain does not result from proclaimed climate threats (securitiza-
tion), but from the growing significance of climate change in international relations 
(climatization). Climatization is about giving a voice to actors specifically con-
cerned with climate change.
Secondly, UNSC’s climate debates connect to the chronology of the international 
negotiations on climate change. While the 2007 debate took place after the Kyoto 
protocol entered into force in 2005, it was also after a failed COP12 where emission 
cuts were hardly discussed. Later that year, the IPCC and Al Gore received the Nobel 
Peace Prize, a key milestone mentioned in introduction of the letter from the Perma-
nent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General to justify the organization of the 2011 debate (S/2011/408, 5 July 2011). 
The 2011 debate was scheduled after the failure of the COP15 in 2009 in Copenha-
gen, soon accentuated by the declaration of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol by 
the Canadian government in December 2011. If the debate at the UNSC could not 
entirely compensate for these governance failures, it did produce the only agreed 
decision on the overall links between climate change and international security 
through a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2011/15).6 The more recent discussions 
also took place in a controversial context with the US withdrawal from the Paris 
agreement and the climate denial of the Trump administration. During the UNSC’s 
debates, member states thus reiterated their commitments to the different instru-
ments attached to the climate convention (Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement) or 
called for their ratification and strengthening. They also punctually denounced their 
‘unfinished business’ (Ghana, 2007) referring to states having ‘too often failed to 
honor their commitments to such frameworks’ (Nigeria 2011). The UNSC therefore 
appears as an alternative to global climate governance that has failed to mitigate 
global warming as put by the delegate from Namibia in 2007: ‘Kyoto 2 will proba-
bly come and go, and so will Kyoto 3 and 4, while our peoples and countries are ren-
dered more and more vulnerable. What we need is action now and not mere debates 
that do not produce concrete results. In this regard, my delegation would like to see 
5 Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations. (2019) Facebook Pro-
file, https ://www.faceb ook.com/SVGMi ssion UN/. Accessed 14 October 2019.
6 Other decisions were only agreed on a case-by-case approach.
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the establishment of an effective mechanism to take charge of the governance of cli-
mate change.’7 Climatization is about attributing responsibility.
Third dealing with sudden crisis as much as long-term political tensions, the 
UNSC is the international forum mandated to address cross-border ‘emergencies.’ 
Since 2007 (year of the first official debate held on climate change), the idiom of 
emergency has been increasingly used to describe the current climate situation. For 
instance, a growing number of public actors, including national parliaments, local 
governments and cities, are declaring climate emergency (The Climate Mobilization 
2019). In the face of this ‘emergency,’ the UNSC’s involvement therefore appears 
logical, even if the emergency framing has been less used by member states during 
the official debates,8 with the notable exception of some small island countries such 
as Barbados whose delegate declared climate change as a ‘global emergency’ in the 
2007 debate (S/PV.5663, 17 April 2007). Climatization is about ensuring the Coun-
cil’s legitimacy and up-to-date agenda in a changing world.
Building on this development, I suggest summarizing the drivers for climatiz-
ing the UNSC into three categories. First, they are strategic: Some member states 
can gain agency through symbolic and material capital by climatizing the UNSC, 
while others can benefit from shifting from the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change’s universal venue to the exclusive club of the UNSC where they may 
already have more power.9 Second, they are instrumental: The UNSC is addressed 
to overcome the failures of global climate governance and take responsibility with 
the (though unlikely) possibility to use coercion, but without the political and ethi-
cal implications of a security framing. Climatization of the UNSC places climate 
change in the highest international political forum while avoiding the security 
logic(s). Third they are symbolic: The climatization of the UNSC helps raise atten-
tion while keeping the Council’s legitimacy as the main multilateral body in charge 
of managing global emergencies. In other words, climatization concerns agency and 
responsibility. The following section further develops these elements by unpacking 
the different dimensions through which climatization processes unfold.
Climatizing the UN Security Council
The analysis of UNSC’s debates on climate change reveals that the Council’s clima-
tization consists of four interrelated developments which expand climate politics and 
help understand the continuous efforts to introduce climate change at the Council.
7 Namibia, however, did not call for a direct engagement from the UNSC in 2007, endorsing the state-
ments by the G77 + China and the Non-Aligned Movement.
8 The other mentions referred to emergency aid and emergency preparedness, especially in the 2019 
debate (UN Security Council, S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019).
9 Some developing countries have, for example, claimed that developed countries were bringing climate 
change at the UNSC to impede their development.
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Securing a Steady Climate Agenda
First despite recurring oppositions by key member states such as China, India and 
Russia, the Council keeps on organizing official debates, but more importantly infor-
mal meetings on climate change. If states can refuse to attend these meetings, such 
sessions maintain the issue on the agenda or ‘ensur[e] the continuity of this debate’ 
as Spain and Malaysia claimed in the concept note presenting the ‘Open Arria-for-
mula meeting on the role of Climate Change as a threat multiplier for Global Secu-
rity’ held on 30 January 2015.10 Since 2013 five Arria-formula meetings have been 
entirely dedicated to climate change (Table 1).
Moreover, consistent advocates have also bypassed oppositions by indirectly 
tackling climate change through related issues. While climate change appeared 
among the issues addressed during the open debate on the ‘new challenges to inter-
national peace and security and conflict prevention’ (convened by Portugal on 23 
November 2011), it was also a critical matter raised during an open debate on ‘Peace 
and security challenges facing small island developing States’ (convened by New 
Zealand on 30 July 2015). Climate change was also addressed during official and 
informal debates on water and security, on the Lake Chad Basin, on the Sahel region 
(Born 2017; Maertens 2018) and more recently on terrorism and violent extrem-
ism in Africa,11 interested member states seizing every opportunity to keep it on 
the agenda. This strategy however has not gone unnoticed as expressed by the Rus-
sian representative during an open debate on hunger and conflicts (convened by the 
Dominican Republic on 29 April 2020): ‘We understand that climate change is very 
trendy now, and there is always a temptation to insert it into every discussion. But 
we need to be frank with ourselves and not to exaggerate its significance in every 
crisis’ (S/2020/340, 29 April 2020). Despite such recurring opposition, the UNSC 
has developed a steady and even growing climate agenda since the first debate in 
2007.
Climate change has also become a campaign issue for member states that seek 
to obtain a seat as a non-permanent member. During the 2011 open debate, Fin-
land, at the time campaigning for a seat for the 2013–2014 period,12 stated: ‘The 
Security Council should, given its pre-eminent role in maintaining international 
peace and security, keep an eye on the emerging security implications of climate 
change. If elected to the Security Council next year, Finland will contribute actively 
to any such assessment and action’ (S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), 20 July 2011). More 
recently the Canadian ambassador to the UN has announced that Canada’s bid for 
UNSC’s seat was to focus on economic security, climate change and gender equal-
ity (McParland 2019). Ireland (Houses of the Oireachtas 2018), Kenya (Kibii 2019) 
and Norway, also running for a seat in 2021–2022, all referred to climate change 
in connection with their candidacy, like the Norwegian delegate during the 2019 
10 http://www.spain un.org/wp-conte nt/uploa ds/2015/06/Conce pt-Note_Clima teCha nge_20150 630.pdf. 
Accessed 9 July 2019.
11 https ://www.un.org/press /en/2020/sc141 40.doc.htm. Accessed 29 May 2020.
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open debate: ‘The climate-security nexus merits, in our view, being firmly placed 
on the Council’s agenda. It is also a priority for Norway, as a candidate country for 
a non-permanent seat in the Council’ (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). Furthermore, 
the Undersecretary for Political Affairs of Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
pointed that ‘during our election campaign we rightly focused on climate change’ 
(Teesalu 2019, emphasis added), almost admitting the strategic dimension of such 
a focus since Estonia was elected for the period 2020–2021 (like Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines). Germany is also presenting its two-year term (2019–2020) as one 
of advocacy in favor of climate change at the UNSC (Maas 2018) with the ultimate 
goal ‘to mainstream matters of climate-related security in all resolutions and in the 
policy of the Security Council’ (Climate Diplomacy 2019, emphasis added). Not 
surprisingly, the German representative expressed disappointment that the security 
implications of climate change were not included in the language of the resolution 
on South Sudan adopted in March 2020 (S/PV.8744, 12 March 2020). Germany, 
together with the Pacific state Nauru, also established a Group of Friends on climate 
and security at the United Nations in August 2018 (with 27 founding members) 
in order ‘to bring the topic into even sharper focus on the United Nations political 
agenda’ (Federal Foreign Office 2018). In other words, climate change has become 
a repeated item on the Council’s agenda with continuous efforts to increase the 
UNSC’s involvement in the matter. This first sign of climatization is supplemented 
by the responsibility attributed to the UNSC in the climate crisis.
Attributing responsibility in the climate crisis
The climatization of the UNSC also entails a definitional process in which the Coun-
cil is framed as enjoined to assume a responsibility toward the climate crisis and the 
necessary political responses.
Over the past years, member states and other speakers intervening during the 
Council’s meetings have asked the UNSC to take responsibility in the global climate 
crisis, like it has been called to do so in matters of human security in the 1990s. 
Most speakers emphasized the urgency of climate change to justify UNSC’s debates. 
They refer to ‘unprecedented’ ‘threat,’ ‘challenges,’ ‘changes,’ ‘scale’ or ‘impacts’ 
while pointing to the ‘new’ or ‘novel’ character of climate change influence on soci-
eties, making clear reference to ‘humanity’ and calling for ‘collective action.’ In 
2019 the delegate from Mauritius expressly emphasized the global dimension of cli-
mate change: ‘no country is immune to the perils of climate change. […] The Secu-
rity Council is therefore the appropriate platform to address this threat to the secu-
rity and prosperity of the globe’ (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). Climate change is 
defined as an urgent and unprecedented priority for the UNSC. The UN Under-Sec-
retary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs who opened the 2019 debate 
also stated: ‘Given the critical role and responsibility of the Security Council, I am 
encouraged by today’s debate. It signals our willingness to establish a shared under-
standing of the impact of climate-related security risks on international peace and 
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security’ (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). After her statement, several member states 
also refer to the Council’s responsibility and obligations:
‘[I]t is our view that it is not illegitimate to think that the Security Council has 
a role, a mission and a responsibility that are yet to be defined.’ (Algeria);
‘It is clear that taking climate risks into account is no longer an option but a 
necessity, if the Council is to assume its full responsibility and strengthen its 
capacity to prevent conflicts.’ (Belgium);
‘The Security Council must become an early-warning system for international 
policy.’ (Germany);
‘The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining inter-
national peace and security. The climate-security nexus merits, in our view, 
being firmly placed on the Council’s agenda.’ (Norway);
‘The consequences certainly transcend the mandate of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and could require a response from 
the Security Council in the context of its responsibilities related to conflict pre-
vention and resolution.’ (Peru).
‘The Council needs to equip itself with a system of risk assessment and strate-
gies that integrate the impact of climate change into its analysis and into con-
flict prevention and peacekeeping.’ (Spain).
Such responsibility is further invoked when international security practices are 
designated as climate problems. The UNSC is the main multilateral arena responsi-
ble for ‘the maintenance of international peace and security’ (UN Charter, Art. 24, 
§1) and plays a critical role in the regulation of international security practices. Yet 
the recent debates at the UNSC have revived the discussions initiated in the 1980s on 
the environmental impacts of conflicts. During their interventions, multiple member 
states emphasized the consequences of (in)security on climate change. For instance, 
in 2018, the delegate from Bolivia argued against discussions on climate change 
held in the UNSC, preferring the UN climate convention, but then dedicated a full 
paragraph to the impacts of ‘military machinery of the most powerful countries on 
the planet’ on the environment (S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018). In 2019, the Slovakian 
delegate called for an integrated approach ‘linking humanitarian, development, cli-
mate-mitigation and peace and security-related action,’ while advocating for ‘fur-
ther steps to more effectively address the critical threats that war and armed conflict 
pose to the environment and conservation efforts’ (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). 
Growing debates over the climate footprint of peacekeeping operations further attest 
how international security issues and practices are understood as part of the climate 
problem.13 Other interventions have also proposed a new account of warfare: ‘Our 
conflict is not being fought with guns and missiles but with weapons from every-
day life—chimney stacks and exhaust pipes. We are confronted with a chemical war 
of immense proportions.’ (Tuvalu, 2007); ‘Humanity, and the developing countries 
in particular, have been subjected to what could be described as low-intensity bio-
logical or chemical warfare.’ (Namibia, 2007). Such reframing is reinforced in the 
13 http://green ingth eblue .org/what-the-un-is-doing /field -missi ons. Accessed 29 May 2020.
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concrete suggestion of the Indonesian delegate during the 2019 debate: ‘One con-
crete step that we can take is to better equip our peacekeepers with the capacity to 
undertake military operations other than war—to carry out not only peacekeeping 
operations but also climate peace missions’ (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). In these 
quotes, a climate lens redefines what counts as war implying an (in)direct responsi-
bility for the UNSC, while allowing a closer involvement of climate actors.
Expanding Climate Actors’ Role
The climatization of the UNSC facilitates a greater role for three types of climate 
actors: climate experts, including climate scientists, international organizations 
mandated on climate change and think tanks; climate activists like non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs); and climate change ‘victims’ understood as states, com-
munities or specific populations with a critical exposure to the adverse effects of 
climate change. Two main techniques have been used to open the Council’s doors to 
these actors.
First during open debates, any UN member state has the right to request the 
UNSC’s President ‘to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right 
to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the 
Council’s provisional rules of procedure’ (S/PV.5663, 17 April 2007). In 2007, 40 
states representatives expressed their wish to take the floor alongside the 15 UNSC 
members, 47 in 2011 and 60 in 2019 (Table 2), setting a record for number of non-
Council members participating in open debates (in 2007 and 2011). If only five extra 
states participated in the 2018 debate, the President of Nauru attended the debate 
and Iraq was represented by its Minister for Water Resources. In 2019, 15 delega-
tions were represented at the ministerial level. During the 2020 video-teleconference 
open debate, six non-Council members intervened, among which Belize delivered a 
statement on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Nauru on behalf 
of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and Denmark on behalf of the 
Nordic countries, but 29 delegations also submitted written statements to express 
their views on the matter (S/2020/751).  Among the non-Council members, states 
infamously well-known for their vulnerability to climate change, such as Bangla-
desh or Pacific small island developing countries, requested to participate, some-
times through a spokesperson like in 2018 when the representative of the Maldives 
addressed the Council on behalf of AOSIS. Their statements emphasized the legiti-
macy of their voice within the Council as the first ones concerned with the adverse 
effects of climate change: ‘We are likely to become the victims of a phenomenon to 
which we have contributed very little and which we can do very little to halt’ (Papua 
New Guinea, on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Small Island Developing States, 
2007). Moreover, the closer involvement of those actors in the Council has not been 
limited to punctual interventions, but also appears in their access to non-permanent 
seat as mentioned previously with the case of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The 
climatization of the Council calls for a greater role for states with a critical exposure 
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Except for the first debate in 2007, each of the UNSC’s meetings also welcomed 
UN senior officers, regional organizations’ representatives and even members from 
civil society (NGOs and think tanks)—detailed list available in Table 2. During these 
debates, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) intervened at the UNSC for the first time in their history, respec-
tively, in 2011 (through its executive director) and 2019 (through its chief scientist). 
UN representatives and non-state actors were also key speakers during the Arria-for-
mula sessions. Indeed if this format is mostly used to overcome some member states’ 
reluctance, it also allows the interventions of multiple experts and NGOs’ representa-
tives that are at the frontline of the advocacy work in favor of mandating the UNSC 
on climate change. For instance, in 2013, the introductory messages by the UK, Paki-
stan (both convenors), the Marshall Islands and Australia (through a video), were fol-
lowed by four interventions by the UN Secretary-General, the president of the German 
Advisory Council on Global Change, the Vice-President and Special Envoy on climate 
change of the World Bank, and the UN Under-Secretary-General for the Least Devel-
oped Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States. 
NGOs’ voices were represented by the intervention of the director of Climate Action 
Network. In the April 2020 Arria-formula meeting, organizers invited the Under-Secre-
tary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to intervene followed by represent-
atives of the NGO International Crisis Group14 and the Stockholm International Peace 
and Research Institute (SIPRI).15 Likewise, NGOs and experts16 are highly active in 
support of the Group of Friends established by Germany and Nauru in 2018 (Adelphi 
2019). While inviting guest speakers, organizing Arria-formula sessions and pursuing 
the debates outside the UNSC are not techniques specific to climate-oriented discus-
sions, taken together they facilitate the greater involvement of climate experts, activists 
and ‘victims’ in the Council, signaling the progressive climatization of the UNSC.
Advocating for a Climate Fix
In their work on the securitization of climate change and the climatization of secu-
rity, Trombetta (2008) and Oels (2012) shed light on the adoption of practices 
‘largely inspired by the practices developed within the environmental sector’ by 
security actors (Trombetta 2008, p. 594). Trombetta (2008) shows the development 
of preventive and nonconfrontational measures (including insurance and compensa-
tion), and Oels discusses the ‘new flexible military response capacities [that] are 
being developed in the North, so that the political order of overwhelmed South-
ern states can be re-established after climate change-induced disaster’ (Oels 2012, 
p. 201). In the case of the UNSC, the renewed interest in prevention17 cannot be 
14 https ://www.crisi sgrou p.org/globa l/clima te-chang e-shapi ng-futur e-confl ict. Accessed 29 May 2020.
15 https ://onu.deleg franc e.org/Event -on-Clima te-and-Secur ity-risks . Accessed 29 May 2020.
16 For instance, see the independent Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks: https ://
www.sipri .org/resea rch/peace -and-devel opmen t/clima te-chang e-and-risk/exper t-worki ng-group -clima te-
relat ed-secur ity-risks . Accessed 30 August 2019.
17 For instance, see the first intervention by the newly appointed UN Secretary-General at the UNSC: 
Security Council, S/PV.7857, 10 January 2017.
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directly attributed to climatization since prevention has been an essential dimension 
of the Council’s work since the 1992 Agenda for Peace by UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Yet the solutions put forward at the UNSC to address the 
security implications of climate change entail recourse to climate-oriented policies 
based on science, preventive risk management, ‘climate proofing’ and institutional 
adaptation. In other words, the climatization of the UNSC emerges from these sug-
gested responses which reinforce both a preventive approach toward conflicts and 
insecurities and an adaptation strategy in terms of climate change.
First, debates at the UNSC have emphasized the need to collect and exchange sci-
entific data and information, echoing decision making in the field of climate change 
where scientific assessments are requested in preparation of international negotia-
tions. While the ‘latest data’ on ‘climate and security risks’ were the focus of the 
April 2020 Arria-formula session, during open debates, states called for more ‘com-
prehensive information from the field’ (Poland, 2018) and for ‘aggregating data’ 
(USA, 2019), while insisting on ‘improving the flow of information’ (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 2011) and advocating for ‘further informative exchanges with repre-
sentatives and experts, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
on the security implications of climate change, as well as more integrated sharing 
of data and expertise’ (Viet Nam, 2019). On the one hand, these recommendations 
reinforce the role of climate experts as relevant partners for the UNSC; on the other 
one, they encourage the application of tools used in climate science such as ‘climate 
data collections, climate scenarios and early-warning systems’ (Switzerland, 2019) 
to address climate and security risks. Such data and scientific mechanisms have been 
promoted to mainstream information throughout the UN system (‘We must integrate 
that data into decision making across the entire United Nations system’ (UK, 2019)) 
and to gather analysis tools in the hands of one ‘guarantor of the scientific message 
that can build consensus on the links between climate and security’ (France, 2020, 
Arria-formula session18). These tools also suggest a risk-management approach 
which aims to enhance ‘a preventive assessment strategy’ and ‘anticipate the conse-
quences’ (France, 2020, Arria-formula session19). Echoing the work on processes of 
riskification through which the security implications of climate change are addressed 
based on a risk-management approach (Corry 2012; Estève 2020), these policy solu-
tions suggest a climate fix to issues pertaining to international security.
The responses recommended during the UNSC’s climate discussions also focus 
on ‘climate proofing,’ cross-cutting intersectoral mechanisms and institutional adap-
tation. For example, during the Arria-formula meeting held in December 2017, con-
venors invited one of the authors of the report ‘A Responsibility to Prepare’ pub-
lished by the Center for Climate and Security alongside the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands. This report defines a preventive agenda intending to ‘cli-
mate-proof’ security institutions, ‘climate proofing’ notably includes ‘routinizing, 
18 https ://onu.deleg franc e.org/Event -on-Clima te-and-Secur ity-risks . Accessed 29 May 2020.
19 Ibid.
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integrating, institutionalizing and elevating attention to climate and security issues 
at these bodies’ (Werrell et al. 2017, p. 1). This process echoes the German Federal 
Foreign Office’s aim to ‘mainstream’ climate-security issues (Climate Diplomacy 
2019) and the objective defined by the French permanent representation ‘to ensure 
that the work of the UN in countries vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
is climate-proofed’ (Arria-formula meeting, 22 April 2020).20 To do so, different 
member states advocated for the appointment of a special representative on climate 
and security within the UN secretariat—Nauru in 2011 and 2018, Canada, Norway, 
Ireland and Tuvalu in 2019. They also encouraged the institutionalization of cli-
mate-security governance within the UN, through the establishment of the Climate 
Security Mechanism in 2018. Staffed by the UN Department of Political and Peace-
building Affairs, the UN Development Programme and UNEP and supported by the 
governments of Sweden, Norway, Germany and UK,21 it is tasked ‘to provide inte-
grated climate risk assessments to the UN Security Council and to other UN bodies’ 
(Smith et al. 2019a; see also Smith et al. 2019b). The project intending to include 
climate considerations into peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding22 precisely 
illustrates a form of adaptation of security institutions through climate proofing. 
While mainstreaming and intersectoral management have been applied within the 
UN for other transversal topics such as gender, the solutions put forward in terms of 
climate change tend to adopt an adaptation strategy for UN institutions confronted 
with the adverse effects of climate change.
This section has identified four developments through which the UNSC is pro-
gressively being climatized. These different elements complement and reinforce 
each other, since for instance climate proofing sustains the Council’s climate agenda 
and its responsibility in the climate crisis, while the recourse to climate policies and 
science increases the role of climate actors in the management of international secu-
rity. They also promote a preventive approach and institutional adaptation seemingly 
raising less opposition than they did a few years ago.
Conclusion
Since 2007, the UNSC has debated the security implications of climate change on 
multiple occasions. Revisiting these discussions, this article enquires about the con-
tinuous efforts which aim to bring climate change on the UNSC’s agenda despite 
apparent failures. Building on previous studies on the climatization of security, it 
considers the UNSC’s debates as an example of a broader process of climatization 
of world politics and explores the different elements through which other domains 
of international politics can be climatized. More than analyzing these debates as a 
21 https ://www.undp.org/conte nt/undp/en/home/2030-agend a-for-susta inabl e-devel opmen t/peace /confl 
ict-preve ntion /clima te-secur ity.html. Accessed 29 May 2020.
22 UNEP has been advocating for this since its report on greening the Blue Helmets (United Nations 
Environment Programme 2012). It echoes the growing literature in environmental peacebuilding (Swain 




new form of greenwashing, the article proposes to look into the expansion of climate 
politics and the potential ensued transformations within other international arenas.
The contributions of this article are twofold. First, it contributes empirically by 
revisiting the UNSC climate debates in connection with other UNSC practices such 
as member states campaigning. Second, it challenges established analytical frames 
on two levels. It disputes the dominant approach based on the securitization frame-
work and demonstrates that, in the case of climate change, a focus on securitization 
does not tell the whole story. It then proposes to further develop the concept of cli-
matization by shedding light on the different components through which climatiza-
tion processes unfold: securing a steady climate agenda; attributing responsibility 
in the climate crisis; expanding climate actors’ role; and advocating for climate-ori-
ented policy solutions.
Further research on the climatization of other policy domains and actors could 
explore the role of these dimensions, as well as identify additional components, 
while informing on the broader trend of climatization of international relations.23 
Moreover, the analysis suggests three fruitful research avenues. First, by identifying 
dynamics of inclusion through the growing involvement of climate actors and that of 
exclusion through the involvement of a non-universal arena, it invites to investigate 
the tension between universality and club diplomacy in global climate governance. 
Likewise, the case of the UNSC shows signs of routinization, through climate proof-
ing and mainstreaming, as much as it calls for exceptional measures. Future research 
could explore this paradox in greater detail. Finally, while the climatization of the 
UNSC mainly entails preventive and adaptation policies, additional work could fur-
ther characterize climatizing moves by distinguishing adaptation- from mitigation-
oriented climatization. Such distinction may help further conceptualize ongoing 
processes of climatization as the debates over the UNSC’s involvement in climate 
politics continue.
Acknowledgements Earlier versions of this paper were presented at ISA 2019 in Toronto, a research 
seminar at Sciences Po Paris in 2019 and at the Graduate Institute Geneva in 2020. I am grateful to eve-
ryone who commented on the paper on these occasions. Moreover, I would like to thank Stefan C. Aykut, 
Ken Conca, Adrien Estève, Judith Nora Hardt, Dhanasree Jayaram and Matt McDonald for their insight-
ful feedback, all the contributors to this special issue, as well as the journal’s anonymous reviewers.
Funding Open Access funding provided by Université de Lausanne. 
Compliance with ethical standards 
Conflict of interest On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of 
interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
23 See other papers in this special issue.
Climatizing the UN Security Council 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
References
Adelphi. 2019. 4 June 2019: Berlin climate and security conference, https ://www.adelp hi.de/en/news/4-
june-2019-berli n-clima te-and-secur ity-confe rence . Accessed 9 July, 2019.
Andonova, L.B. 2010. Public-private partnerships for the earth: Politics and patterns of hybrid author-
ity in the multilateral system. Global Environment Politics 10: 25–53. https ://doi.org/10.1162/
glep.2010.10.2.25.
Ascelrad, H. 2010. The “environmentalization” of social struggles–the environmental justice movement 
in Brazil. Estudos Avançados 24: 103–119.
Aykut, S. C., Foyer, J., Morena, E. 2017. Globalising the Climate: COP21 and the climatisation of global 
debates. Routledge.
Balzacq, T., ed. 2011. Securitization theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve. New York: 
Routledge.
Born, C. 2017. A resolution for a peaceful climate: Opportunities for the UN Security Council (SIPRI 
Policy Brief).
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., Wilde, J. de. 1998. Security: A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers.
Climate Diplomacy. 2017. From analysis to action—high profile experts launch declaration on climate 
and security, 14 December, https ://www.clima te-diplo macy.org/news/analy sis-actio n-high-profi le-
exper ts-launc h-decla ratio n-clima te-and-secur ity. Accessed 9 July, 2019.
Climate Diplomacy. 2019. “We will address climate-related security risks in the Security Council”—
Interview with German Diplomat Michaela Spaeth, 15 April, https ://www.clima te-diplo macy.org/
news/%E2%80%9Cwe-will-addre ss-clima te-relat ed-secur ity-risks -secur ity-counc il%E2%80%9D-
%E2%80%93-inter view-germa n-diplo mat. Accessed 9 July, 2019.
Collective, C.A.S.E. 2006. Critical approaches to security in Europe: A networked manifesto. Security 
Dialogue 37: 443–487. https ://doi.org/10.1177/09670 10606 07308 5.
Conca, K. 2019. Is there a role for the UN security council on climate change? Environment: Science 
and Policy for Sustainable Development 61: 4–15. https ://doi.org/10.1080/00139 157.2019.15408 11.
Conca, K., J. Thwaites, and G. Lee. 2017. Climate change and the un security council: Bully pulpit or bull 
in a china shop? Global Environmental Politics 17: 1–20. https ://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00398 .
Corry, O. 2012. Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-order security and the politics of climate 
change. Millennium 40: 235–258. https ://doi.org/10.1177/03058 29811 41944 4.
Cousins, S. 2013. UN Security Council: Playing a role in the international climate change regime? Peace, 
Security & Global Change 25: 191–210. https ://doi.org/10.1080/14781 158.2013.78705 8.
Dellmuth, L.M., M.-T. Gustafsson, N. Bremberg, and M. Mobjörk. 2018. Intergovernmental organiza-
tions and climate security: Advancing the research agenda. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate 
Change 9: e496. https ://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.496.
Elbe, S. 2010. Security and global health. Polity, Cambridge.
Elliott, L. 2003. Imaginative adaptations: A possible environmental role for the UN Security Council. 
Contemporary Security Policy 24: 47–68. https ://doi.org/10.1080/13523 26031 23312 71909 .
Estève, A. 2020. Preparing the French military to a warming world: Climatization through riskification. 
International Politics. https ://doi.org/10.1057/s4131 1-020-00248 -2.
Floyd, R. 2010. Security and the environment: Securitisation theory and US environmental security pol-
icy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Floyd, R., and R. Matthew, eds. 2013. Environmental Security: Approaches and Issues. 1 edn. New York: 
Routledge.
Federal Foreign Office. 2018. United Nations: Germany initiates Group of Friends on Climate and Secu-
rity, https ://www.auswa ertig es-amt.de/en/ausse npoli tik/theme n/klima /clima te-and-secur ity-new-
group -of-frien ds/21256 82. Accessed 9 July, 2019.
 L. Maertens 
Hardt, J.N. 2017. Environmental Security in the Anthropocene: Assessing theory and practice. New York: 
Routledge.
Houses of the Oireachtas. 2018. UN Security Council. Dáil Éireann Debate, Wednesday—28 March 
2018, https ://www.oirea chtas .ie/en/debat es/quest ion/2018-03-28/69/. Accessed 30 August, 2019.
Ide, T. 2020. The dark side of environmental peacebuilding. World Development 127: 104777. https ://doi.
org/10.1016/j.world dev.2019.10477 7.
Kibii, E. 2019. Kenya ups push for UNSC non-permanent member slot. The Star, 17 July, https ://www.
the-star.co.ke/news/2019-07-17-kenya -ups-push-for-unsc-non-perma nent-membe r-slot/. Accessed 
30 August, 2019.
Kurtz, G. 2012. Securitization of Climate Change in the United Nations 2007–2010, in: Scheffran, J., 
Brzoska, M., Brauch, H.G., Link, P.M., Schilling, J. (Eds.), Climate change, human security and 
violent conflict: Challenges for societal stability, hexagon series on human and environmental secu-
rity and peace. Springer, Berlin, pp. 669–684. https ://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626 -1_33
Louis, M., & Maertens, L. 2021. Why International Organizations Hate Politics. Depoliticizing the 
World. Routledge.
Maas, H. 2018. Speech by Foreign Minister Maas at the general debate of the 73rd General Assembly of 
the United Nations, https ://www.auswa ertig es-amt.de/en/newsr oom/news/maas-gener al-assem bly-
un/21423 00. Accessed 30 August, 2019.
Maertens, L. 2016. Quand le Bleu passe au vert: La sécurisation de l’environnement à l’ONU. In Sécurité 
et environnement, ed. N. Clinchamps, C. Cournil, C. Fabregoule, and G. Ganapathy-Dore, 59–82. 
Bruylant.
Maertens, L. 2018. Le changement climatique en débat au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. Revue interna-
tionale et stratégique, 109: 105–114.
Maertens, L. 2019. From blue to green? Environmentalization and securitization in UN peacekeep-
ing practices. International Peacekeeping 26 (3): 302–326. https ://doi.org/10.1080/13533 
312.2019.15796 48.
Maertens, L., and A. Baillat. 2017. The partial climatisation of migrations, security and conflict. In Glo-
balising the Climate: COP21 and theclimatisation of global debates, ed. S.C. Aykut, J. Foyer, and 
E. Morena, 116–134. Routledge.
McDonald, M. 2018. Climate change and security: towards ecological security? International Theory 10: 
153–180. https ://doi.org/10.1017/S1752 97191 80000 39.
McDonald, M. 2013. Discourses of climate security. Political Geography 33: 42–51. https ://doi.
org/10.1016/j.polge o.2013.01.002.
McDonald, M. 2008. Securitization and the construction of security. The European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations 14: 563–587.
McParland, K. 2019. Posturing UN Security Council is the essence of Trudeau’s politics. National Post, 
3 July, https ://natio nalpo st.com/opini on/kelly -mcpar land-postu ring-un-secur ity-counc il-is-the-essen 
ce-of-trude aus-polit ics. Accessed 9 July, 2019.
Methmann, C., Rothe, D. 2013. Apocalypse now! From exceptional rhetoric to risk management in global 
climate politics. In: Stephan, B., Rothe, D., Stephan, B. (Eds.), Interpretive approaches to global 
climate governance. Routledge, London, pp. 105–121. https://doi.org/https ://doi.org/10.4324/97802 
03385 579-15
Oels, A. 2013. Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency. Geoforum 
45: 17–29. https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.geofo rum.2011.09.007.
Oels, A. 2012. From ‘Securitization’ of Climate Change to ’Climatization‘ of the Security Field: Com-
paring Three Theoretical Perspectives, in: Scheffran, J., Brzoska, M., Brauch, H.G., Link, P.M., 
Schilling, J. (Eds.), Climate change, human security and violent conflict, hexagon series on human 
and environmental security and peace. Springer, Berlin, pp. 185–205. https://doi.org/https ://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626 -1_9
Penny, C. 2007. Greening the security council: Climate change as an emerging “threat to international 
peace and security.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 7: 
35–71.
Rothe, D. 2016. Securitizing global warming. A climate of complexity. Abingdon: Routledge.
Scott, S. V. 2012. The securitization of climate change in world politics: How close have we come and 
would full securitization enhance the efficacy of global climate change policy? Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 21: 220–230. https ://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12008 .
Scott, S. V. 2008. Securitizing climate change: International legal implications and obstacles. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 21: 603–619. https ://doi.org/10.1080/09557 57080 24529 46.
Climatizing the UN Security Council 
Scott, S.V., and C. Ku. 2018. Climate change and the UN Security Council. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing.
Security Council Report. 2019. Arria-Formula Meetings, 1992–2019. https ://www.secur ityco uncil repor 
t.org/un-secur ity-counc il-worki ng-metho ds/arria -formu la-meeti ngs.php. Accessed 30 Aug 2019
Smith, D., Mobjörk, M., Krampe, F. and Eklöw, K. 2019a. Climate Security in times of geopolitical cri-
ses—What ways forward? SIPRI, 18 February, https ://www.sipri .org/comme ntary /blog/2019/clima 
te-secur ity-times -geopo litic al-crise s-what-ways-forwa rd. Accessed 30 August, 2019.
Smith, D., Mobjörk, M., Krampe, F. and Eklöw, K. 2019b Climate Security. Making it #Doable. The 
Hague: The Clingendael Institute.
Swain, A., and J. Öjendal, eds. 2018. Routledge handbook of environmental conflict and peacebuilding. 1 
edition. London: Routledge.
Teesalu, P. 2019. Estonia’s Options in the UN and the Security Council. RKK-ICDS, 22 August, https ://
icds.ee/eston ias-optio ns-in-the-un-and-the-secur ity-counc il/. Accessed 30 August, 2019.
The Climate Mobilization. 2019. The Climate Emergency Campaign advocates for and tracks these deci-
sions worldwide, https ://www.thecl imate mobil izati on.org/clima te-emerg ency-campa ign. Accessed 
9 July, 2019.
The Hague Declaration for Planetary Security (2017).
Trombetta, M. J. 2011. Rethinking the securitization of the environment: Old beliefs, new insights, in: 
Balzacq, T. (Ed.), Securitization Theory. How security problems emerge and dissolve. Routledge, 
London, pp. 135–149. https ://doi.org/10.4324/97802 03868 508-16
Trombetta, M.J. 2008. Environmental security and climate change: analysing the discourse. Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs 21: 585–602. https ://doi.org/10.1080/09557 57080 24529 20.
United Nations Environment Programme 2012 Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment Natural 
Resources and UN Peacekeeping Operations UNEP, Nariobi
van Schaik, L., Born, C., Sellwood, E., de Bruin, S. 2019. Making Peace with Climate. Background paper 
for the global commission on adaptation, https ://cdn.gca.org/asset s/2019-09/Makin g_peace _with_
clima te.pdf. Accessed 16 October, 2019.
von Lucke, F., Z. Wellmann, and T. Diez. 2014. What’s at stake in securitising climate change? Towards 
a differentiated approach. Geopolitics 19: 857–884. https ://doi.org/10.1080/14650 045.2014.91302 8.
Webersik, C. 2012. Securitizing Climate Change: The United Nations Security Council Debate, in: Envi-
ronmental leadership: A reference handbook. SAGE Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks, pp. 549–
556. https ://doi.org/10.4135/97814 52218 601
Werrell, C., Femia, F., Goodman, S. and Fetzek, S. 2017. A responsibility to prepare: Governing in an 
age of unprecedented risk and unprecedented foresight. The Center for Climate and Security. Briefer 
no. 38.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
